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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION-THE MASON LAW
Contemporary public concern for the environment has prompted
many states to adopt constitutional amendments' and other legislative
enactments.' In the area of specific legislation, traditional notions of
state police power, tempered by Fourteenth Amendment due process
considerations, may seriously affect the states' capacity to respond to
ecological problems. The restriction on the states' legislative power
results from the imposition on the states of the constitutional mandate,
embodied in the Fifth Amendment, that private property shall not
be "taken for public use, without just compensation." This provision
has been applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and has
engendered the development of two distinct, although analogous, con-
stitutional doctrines—eminent domain and police power."
Under the right of eminent domain the owner of private property
cannot suffer a diminution in the use or enjoyment of his property
by governmental action without compensation. A central element of
this doctrine requires that the property be taken by the government
for the beneficial use of the public. The state's exercise of the police
power, in contrast, is directed toward the elimination of a use of
property which detrimentally affects the public interest. Unlike emi-
nent domain, the police power regulates the use of, or impairs rights
in, the property without awarding the owner any compensation for
the loss of his property rights.
Historically, the exercise of a state's police power was limited to
situations, within its borders, which have deleterious effects on the
safety, health or morals of its inhabitants.' But more recent decisions
have been willing to include purposes other than the direct protection
of safety, health or morals within the sphere of police power.' This
inclusion of other than traditional purposes, such as environmental
I See Platt, Toward Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56 A.B.A.J.
1061 (1970).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Agric. and Mkt. Law § 358-a (McKinney 1970).
8 The distinction is outlined in 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1970):
It has been said to be difficult to distinguish consistently between the right of
eminent domain and the police power . . . ; however, they are quite distinct,
although analogous .... Eminent domain takes property because it is useful to
the public, while the police power regulates the use of property or impairs rights
in property because the free exercise of these rights is detrimental to public
interest .... Exercise of eminent domain [in taking private property for public
use results in [the] owner ... [being] invariably entitled to compensation, while
the police power is usually exerted merely to regulate the use and enjoyment of
property by the owner .. [and] the owner [is not] entitled to any compensa-
tion for any injury which he may sustain.
4 See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 139 (1893).
5 See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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protection, has necessarily resulted in some contraction of constitu-
tional guarantees. Although these decisions view the substance of con-
stitutional guarantees as essentially static, the scope of application of
these guarantees is considered to be "expanding or contracting to
meet new and different conditions which are constantly coming within
the field of their operation."
Within the last two decades, the scope of Fourteenth Amendment
due process guarantees with respect to property ownership and use
has narrowed in the face of growing recognition of aesthetic and
ecological problems. Although the 'cases concerning these problems
have fallen conceptually into two judicial categories—aesthetics and
environmental?—these decisions have been substantively linked to-
gether. In these decisions, some state legislation designed to preserve
or enhance the aesthetic qualities of the state has already withstood
attacks based on due process considerations. 8 Similarly, with only one
notable exception,9
 state efforts to preserve the natural environment
have been upheld," even though implementing these efforts required
the destruction or confiscation of private property without compen-
sation.11
 To date, the furthest extension of judicial approval of a
state's exercise of its police power occurred in A.E. Nettleton Co. v.
Diamond.12
In Nettleton, the New York Court of Appeals declared the Mason
Law" to be a valid exercise of that state's police power. The Mason
0
 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 387.
7 Although the aesthetics and environmental cases which are concerned with the
exercise of the police power fall roughly into these two categories, there are no sub-
stantive legal differences between the two areas. The distinction has developed as a result
of a judicial labeling process. Because the word "environment" did not possess its present
broad definition when the first aesthetics cases were tried, courts chose the more specific
label of aesthetics. Time has eliminated this definitional problem, yet the artificial distinc-
tion still persists. However, while observing this nominal distinction, courts have con-
strued the problems raised in aesthetics and environmental cases as substantively the
same. See, e.g., Was Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Goldberg, 55 N.J. 347, 362 A.2d 199
(1970).
8 See, e.g., People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), appeal dis-
missed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St.2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968),
appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 163 (1969).
0 Johnson v. Maine,	 Me.	 265 A.2d 711 (1970).
18 See, e.g., Adams v. Shannon, 7 Cal. App.3d 427, 86 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1970); Corsa
v. Tawes, 149 E. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1957).
11 See 29A C.J.S., supra note 3.
12 27 N.Y.2d 182, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1970).
18 N.Y. Agric. and Mkt. Law f 358-a (McKinney 1970):
No part of the skin or body, whether raw or manufactured, of the following
species of wild animals or the animal itself may be sold or offered for sale by
any individual, firm, corporation, association or partnership within the state of
New York after the effective date of this section:—Leopard (Panthera pardus),
Snow Leopard (Unda uncia), Clouded Leopard (Neofelis nebulosa), Tiger
(Panthera tigres), Cheetah (Acinoyx jubatus), Alligators, Caiman or Crocodile
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Law prohibited the sale or offer for sale within the State of New York
of any part of the skin or body of certain wild animals." The law's
coverage extended to animals not indigenous to the state. In upholding
the statute, the Court of Appeals found: (1) that the wildlife of the
world was a vital asset to the people of New York, and (2) that main-
tenance of the world life cycle was a valid purpose within the state's
police power." This comment will focus on the court's recognition of
the state's role in maintaining the world ecological cycle as being a
valid purpose within New York's police power. In particular, the com-
ment will consider the judicial reaction to state regulation which only
indirectly affects the public interest. After discussing the police power
issues raised in Nettleton and their application to aesthetics and en-
vironmental cases, the analysis will shift to these issues as they
directly affect Nettleton. The comment will also consider the practical
consequences of the decision.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE POLICE POWER
Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees and the states'
right to exercise police power have always existed in a state of ten-
sion." Because exercise of the police power often requires the con-
fiscation or destruction of private property," due process guarantees"
have traditionally acted as somewhat of a restraint on this regulatory
power. In the early part of this century, the Supreme Court con-
sistently struck down state regulatory acts because it believed that
the beneficial aspects of leaving the activity unregulated outweighed
the negative considerations inherent in government control." This
of the Order Crocodylia, Vicuna (Vicugna vicugna), Red Wolf (Canis niger),
or Polar Bear (Thalarctos maritimus), nor after a period of twelve months from
the effective date of this section, of the following species: —Mountain Lion,
sometimes called Cougar (Fells concolar), Jaguar (Panthera onca), Ocelot (Fells
pardalis), or Margay (Fells wiedii).
The Mason Law's provisions effectively limit the market for goods made from the skins
of these endangered species in New York. For corporations such as A.E. Nettleton, who
manufacture and sell goods principally made from these proscribed skins, the provisions
of the Mason Law will prove disastrous. These corporations are faced with the un-
pleasant choice of either developing a completely new line of products or transferring
their operations to other states where the laws are more favorable to the corporation's
products.
14 The state Supreme Court had declared the same statute unconstitutional in A.R.
Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 63 Misc.2d 885, 313 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1970).
18 27 N.Y.2d at 194, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
10 E. Freund, Police Power 11 68 (1904).
17 See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1893).
18 See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S, Coast. amend. XIV.
19
 See, e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1916). In this case, a state statute for-
bade employment agencies from taking placement fees from employees. The legislation
was designed to eliminate the extortionate practices of these agencies by shifting the
expense to those who could bargain better as, for example, could the employers. The
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view has eroded, however, and the steady decline of broad judicial
examination of state-regulated activity has continued." Courts now
hesitate to interfere with state legislation unless it runs "afoul of some
specific federal constitutional prohibition, or some valid federal law.""
A similar conflict between due process guarantees and state police
power has developed with reference to the particular remedy selected
by the state to achieve its goals. Early decisions, such as Weaver v.
Palmer Bros. Co.,22
 advocated broad judicial scrutiny of legislative
action and compelled the states to devise the "least restrictive" solu-
tions to the problems confronting them; otherwise, the statute would
be declared invalid. The Weaver view was originally challenged by
Justice Holmes." He considered the function of courts as limited to
determining whether the legislative remedy was related to the evil
sought to be abolished." Federal courts have largely accepted Holmes'
position,25
 although some state courts cling to the more traditional view
of Weaver."
The relaxation of judicial scrutiny with respect to the purpose of
legislative remedies has, in constitutional terms, expanded the range
of activities admitting of state regulation. This shrinking of the judicial
role to "an extremely narrow one"" has, moreover, made the concept
of police power an amorphous one. The range of the police power has
been termed "the product of legislative determinations addressed to
the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor histori-
cally capable of complete definition!" 28
 Coupled with the hesitancy
of the judiciary to upset state legislative schemes, the uncertain defi-
nition of police power minimizes the precedent value of cases in gen-
eral and emphasizes the particular facts of the individual case.
Supreme Court found that even though the agencies charged excessive rates, they served
some beneficial purpose because they placed some people in jobs.
20
 The decline of broad judicial examination of state-regulated activity has roughly
paralleled the demise of the "freedom of contract" theory of constitutional law. Lincoln
Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). The simultaneous change of judicial
attitudes on these issues demonstrated the emerging willingness of the Court to permit
states to restrict business activity.
21 Id. at 536. The Lincoln case specifically criticizes the view taken by the majority
in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1916).
22
 270 U.S. 402 (1925).
23
 Id. at 415-16.
24
 Id. This view was followed in Staten Island Loaders v. Waterfront Comm'n, 117
F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 439, rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 994 (1954),
25
 Id. Most state decisions have adopted this extremely flexible view of the relation-
ship between the means adopted and the evil to be remedied. In these cases, the function
of the court is defined as determining that the relationship between the means and the
evil be not "'wholly vain and fanciful,'" Grimm v. City of New York, 56 Misc.2d 525,
289 N.Y,S.2d 358 (1968).
26 See, e.g., People v. Bunts, 9 N.Y.2d 1, 210 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961),
27
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
28 Id.
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Together, this flexible definition and relaxed judicial posture pro-
vide the context in which the Nettleton case must be examined. Since
the dissent in that case questioned both the constitutional propriety
of the legislation's purpose and the coverage of the Mason Law's im-
plementing provisions, the context in which these questions are con-
sidered is crucial in determining prospective adherence to the Nettle-
ton result. It is suggested that an analysis of other cases in the areas
of aesthetics and the environment will result in a better understanding
of how this judicial climate operates, and will produce a clear rationale
for the Nettleton decision.
II. AESTHETICS AND POLICE POWER
The judicial response to legislation designed in whole or in part
to protect or enhance the aesthetic quality of a state has undergone
a broad transformation in this century. Initially, courts entertained a
narrow view of aesthetic considerations as a proper purpose for exer-
cising the police power. Somewhat grudgingly" at first, this narrow
outlook was supplanted by a broader view which upheld exercises of
police power bottomed more explicitly upon aesthetic purposes.
The first recognition of the validity of aesthetics as a public pur-
pose within the scope of the state's police power occurred in a Massa-
chusetts case,'Welch v. Swasey.a° There the petitioner challenged as
a deprivation of property without due process of law, the validity
of a city ordinance which limited the height of buildings in certain
areas of the municipality. The court found that the principal purpose
of the statute was to protect citizens from the ravages of upper story
fires and to insure the free flow of sunshine and fresh air throughout
the urban area. The court acknowledged aesthetics as a public purpose,
however, stating that
the inhabitants of a city or town cannot be compelled to give
up rights in property, or to pay taxes, for purely aesthetic
objects; but if the primary and substantive purpose of the
legislation is such as justifies the act, the considerations of
taste and beauty may enter in, as auxiliary.'
A later case from the same jurisdiction, General Outdoor Adver-
tising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 32 approached the issue of
legislating aesthetic protection in a slightly different manner. In one
29 For a summary of how slowly this process developed see Comment, Aesthetics as
a Justification for the Exercise of the Police Power or Eminent Domain, 23 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 730 (19.55).
80 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907).
81 Id. at 375, 79 N.E. at 746.
82 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935).
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of the first of many suits brought by billboard owners challenging the
constitutionality of state and local regulation of outdoor advertising,"
the court found aesthetic preservation to be within the scope of the
police power when exercised "in conjunction with the promotion of
safety of travel on the public ways."" As distinguished from earlier
cases,35
 this decision recognized aesthetics as an equally valid public
purpose when joined with another more traditional purpose, such as
direct physical safety. This view sharply contrasted with the earlier
conception of aesthetics as an auxiliary or subsidiary purpose, and
illustrated the increasing willingness of some courts to defer to legis-
lative determination of the proper purposes for the exercise of the
police power.
This broad view of police power again prevailed in Berman v.
Parker," where the Supreme Court upheld an urban renewal act of
Congress as a valid exercise of the police power." In characterizing
the limits, as well as the subjects, of the police power as being so
diverse as to be incapable of clear definition, Justice Douglas sanc-
tioned aesthetics as a public purpose:
The values it [the results of the exercise of police power]
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled."
Justice Douglas' sweeping recognition of the police power's seemingly
limitless nature, as well as the hesitancy of the judiciary to interfere
with its exercise," established the context in which later aesthetic
cases were to be reviewed 4 0 In effect, each case was to be considered
on its own merits, with precedent bearing only slightly on its outcome.
The inclination of courts to consider each challenge to the police
power on a case-by-case basis, rather than through broad judicial
83 These regulations were principally concerned with the location and extent of out-
door advertising. In most instances, the billboards in issue were located on public
thoroughfares.
34 289 Mass. at 187, 193 N.E. at 816.
83 See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 0907).
88 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
37 This case dealt with an act of Congress (urban renewal in the District of Co-
lumbia) which is not traditionally considered as an exercise of the police power in the
sense that state and local governments exercise it. However, this federal situation is much
like that of the states in that Fifth Amendment guarantees, without the operation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, are in tension with the legislative exercise of the police power.
38 348 U.S. at 33.
89 Id. at 32.
4° For a critical view of Justice Douglas' failure to distinguish police power from
the power of eminent domain in Berman, see Note, 40 Iowa L. Rev. 659 (1955).
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declarations, is well demonstrated in two recent cases. In State v.
Buckley," a state statute required, for purely aesthetic reasons, the
concealment of the work and storage areas of junk yards located
within the state. The court found constitutional the extensive regula-
tions imposed by a state board on the appearance of the junk yard
since the junk yard, the court held, interfered with the "natural aesthe-
tics of the surrounding countryside!" 42 In another case," where the
interference with the natural aesthetics of the area was less than
"patent and gross,"44 the New York Court of Appeals sustained an
ordinance which regulated the location of clotheslines as a valid exer-
cise of the police power. The court stated:
It is settled that conduct which is similarly offensive to the
senses of hearing and smell may be a valid subject of regula-
tion under police power . . . and we perceive no basis for a
different result merely because the sense of sight is involved."
Thus, the willingness of the courts to embrace aesthetics as a valid
public purpose" which alone may justify state action, has consider-
ably altered the context in which police power cases are examined.
Similarly, the requirement, seen in the earlier cases, that police power
should be exercised only to eliminate direct dangers to the public
health, safety or morals has diminished.
The hesitancy of courts to interfere with statutes oriented towards
aesthetics, and their concomitant failure to provide firm judicial guide-
lines, contributes to the nebulous definition of police power. More-
over, the progression of cases in aesthetics illustrates the development
of the judicial conception of the flexible context in which police power
questions should be examined. Not surprisingly, this flexible approach
to the problems of police power has, to some extent, been adopted in
cases dealing with the environment.
III. THE ENVIRONMENT AND POLICE POWER
The development of the judicial attitude towards state legislation
aimed at preserving the environment has closely paralleled the growth
of the judicial conception of police power as revealed in the aesthetics
cases. With only one exception,'" the judiciary has thus far avoided
91 16 Ohio St.2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 163 (1969).
42 16 Ohio St.2d at 132, 243 N.E.2d at 70.
93 People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S.
42 (1963).
44 State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St.2d 128, 132, 243 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1968).
45 12 N.Y.2d at 468, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
40 See, e.g., Jasper v. Kentucky, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964).
41 Johnson v. Maine, — Me. —, 265 A.2d 711 (1970,
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interfering with environmental legislation, and has recognized the
broad power of the states to legislate in this area.
The original source of this recognition was manifested in nine-
teenth century decisions" which acknowledged the right of the state
to regulate the destruction of its wildlife. In these early cases, the
Supreme Court recognized state confiscation of fishing equipment used
in restricted waters as a valid exercise of the police power, although
private property was being taken without compensation." The ratio-
nale advanced for these decisions was the need of the state to preserve
its indigenous food supply for the health of its citizens." However,
since meat and fish were being gathered and sold on a commercial
basis, the protection of wildlife for the purpose of insuring an adequate
food supply appears to have been an illusory effort to base the deci-
sions on a more traditional public purpose. The statutes in question
were plainly directed at conserving the supply of game, and, by im-
plication, preserving the ecological balance of the state's wildlife."
Adherence to the purported traditional purpose of these statutes,
however, has gradually eroded. In instances where the traditional
rationale was relied upon less heavily, the courts were slow to articu-
late an alternative rationale based primarily on ecological grounds. In
Corsa v. Ta2ves, 82 for example, a state statute prohibited the use of purse
seining in Maryland's tidal waters." In upholding the statute as a valid
exercise of the state's police power, the court labored somewhat in
identifying the public purpose which the statute served. Ultimately,
the court determined that the purpose was to protect the Menhaden
fish which provided eleven percent of another species' food supply."
Unlike the earlier cases, Corsa chose a novel public purpose as the
basis for the state's exercise of the police power. Although it failed
to articulate such purpose precisely, the rationale of preserving fish
for the diet of another species of fish is grounded in a conception of
ecological balance. Corsa differed from the earlier decisions in another
48 See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1893).
48 Id.
88 Id. See also New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908).
81 The language of Justice Day in New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg discloses this
sort of rationale:
It is not disputed that this [game laws] is a well-recognized and often-exerted
power of the State and necessary to the protection of the supply of game which
would otherwise be rapidly depleted, and which, in spite of laws passed for its
protection, is rapidly disappearing from many portions of the country.
211 U.S. at 39.
82 149 F. Supp. /71 (D. Md. 1957).
53 A federal statute provided that the states of the tidal region were permitted to
regulate fishing in the tidal waters. Id. at 773.
54
 Id. at 775-76.
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sense. While those cases depicted the judiciary's role in examining
police power questions as a broad one,55 the court in Corsa hesitated
to interfere even though the purpose of the statute was uncertain to
the court, and even though a segment of the Maryland fishing in-
dustry would be destroyed if the statute were upheld."
The background against which the court operated in treating the
police power issue in Corsa is similar to that present in the aesthetics
cases. The rationale of Corsa and the aesthetic cases would seem to
lend support to the broad scope of police power outlined by Justice
Douglas in Berman v. Parker." Yet there is a residual reluctance on
the part of the judiciary to relinquish the more traditional notions of
police power in environmental cases. In particular, the spectre of
Justice Holmes' pronouncements on the sacrosanctity of real property
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon lingers: "[W]hile property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking. 755
In Johnson v. Maine," the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, im-
pressed by Justice Holmes' observations on the nature of real property
rights," struck down as unconstitutional a state conservation measure
directed at preserving the ecology of the state's marshlands. In finding
that a statutory restriction on the use of privately owned wetlands
constituted a taking, the court limited the exercise of the police power
to regulating direct dangers to public health, safety or morals.61 Of
course, Maine could limit the use of the land by compensating the
owner, but as a practical matter, Johnson deprives the state of any
control since it necessarily lacks the financial resources to provide
compensation to each and every such owner.
In comparison with the aesthetics cases and the conclusions
reached in Corsa v. Tawes, the Johnson decision appears to be some-
what of an anomaly. The restrictive view of the police power, as well
as the court's willingness to interfere with state legislation, contrasts
sharply with the results in these other cases. To some degree, the
Johnson case may be distinguished because real property rights were
68 See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1893).
56 The only commercially feasible way to fish for Menhaden was through purse
seining.
157 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
58 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice Brandeis, in his dissent, initiated a less protec-
tive view of property rights which has gradually, although not completely, undermined
Holmes' statement of the law. Id. at 417.
ao 
— Me.	 265 A.2d 711 (1970).
go Id. at	 265 A.2d at 715.
61 Id. at	 265 A.2d at 717 (dictum).
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at issue," although zoning ordinances, which similarly restrict the use
of private property, have been held not to constitute a taking."
Besides the zoning analogy, the judicial doctrine of public trust"
might arguably have been applied in Johnson to uphold the state's
action. Historically, land which has a peculiarly public nature, such
as waterfront property, makes adaptation of the land for purely pri-
vate use inappropriate even though some proprietary rights may be
asserted." Application of the public trust doctrine to this type of
land in order to restrict its owner's use has occurred in instances in
which navigation or fishing rights were involved 0 0 Although tradi-
tionally wetlands have not been subsumed under the doctrine, the
value of these areas to the public might arguably justify the judicial
limitation on their use. In view of the developments in zoning law,
and the possible application of the public trust doctrine, the environ-
mental and aesthetics cases suggest that the Johnson decision, despite
its distinguishing feature, is certainly questionable.
Another case, Adams v. Shannon," further undermines the ratio-
nale of the Johnson case. The statute in Adams prohibited the im-
portation, possession or sale of any animal •which a state board
determined to be detrimental to native wildlife. In order to import
and possess such an animal (in this instance, the animals were piranha
fish), the owner had to obtain a permit from the appropriate state
board. The defendant failed to comply with this provision and his fish
were confiscated and destroyed. In sustaining the action of the licens-
ing board, a California court of appeals held that such a statute is a
proper exercise of police power when the "[1]egislature reasonably
determines that the action is needed to protect the local ecology.""
Like the aesthetics cases and some of the environmental decisions, the
62 According to the majority view, compensation must be provided for the public
use of personally as well as realty provided the personalty interest is ascertainable. 29A
C.J.S. Eminent Domain 4 108 (1970). Therefore, effective distinctions cannot be drawn
between realty and personalty for the purpose of requiring compensation.
53 See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
04 One author has described the effect and limits of the judicially administered pub-
lic trust doctrine:
Courts have held that since the state has an obligation as trustee which it may
not lawfully divest, whatever title the grantee has taken is impressed with the
public trust and must be read in conformity with it. . . • The traditional cases
suggest the extremes of the legal constraints upon the states: no grant may be
made to a private party if the grant is of such amplitude that the state will
effectively have given up its authority to govern, but a grant is not illegal be-
cause it diminishes in some degree the quantum of traditional uses.
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 473, 486-89 (1970).
05 Id. at 489.
30 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
87 7 Cal. App.3d 427, 86 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1970).
68 Id. at 432, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
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result in Adams comports with the emerging broad scope of the police
power. Similarly, Adams also permits the legislature to determine
what remedy will safeguard the local ecology. However, the decision
goes one step further. By explicitly recognizing ecology as a public
purpose, this case upholds the regulation of what is at best an unsub-
stantiated threat to the state's environment.°° The other cases in this
area require the danger to be imminent: either the aesthetic values of
the state must in someway be destroyed or impaired," or else the wild-
life of the state must be directly affected as through extinction by
destruction" or starvation."
The recognition of the scope of the police power as including the
power to eliminate not only proximate threats to the environment,
but even remote dangers to the state's ecology, is quite similar to the
issue raised in Nettleton. In addition, the context in which the issues
in Adams were considered also approaches the judicial climate gen-
erally prevailing in police power cases concerning aesthetic and en-
vironmental legislation. Based on these considerations, an analysis of
Nettleton should demonstrate that it was correctly decided.
IV. A.E. NETTLETON CO. V. DIAMOND
The A.E. Nettleton Co. was engaged in the manufacture, sale and
distribution of men's footwear made from alligator and crocodile
skins which are protected by the Mason Law." A.E. Nettleton ini-
tiated an action for judgment declaring the Mason Law unconstitu-
tional and for an injunction against enforcement of the statute.
The Nettleton decision actually poses two questions: first, whether the
purpose of the legislation in this case went beyond the scope of the
state's police power; and second, if the purpose was within the scope
of the police power, whether the remedy chosen was reasonably related
to eradicating the evil. To answer these questions it is necessary to
examine the legislative climate in which the Mason Law was enacted.
The Mason Law was the outgrowth of acute public concern over
09
 Although the case quotes state officials as saying the piranha, if placed in the
local waters, would constitute a threat to the state's wildlife, there is a dispute as to evi-
dence of whether the piranha could survive in California's waters. There is, however,
proof that the piranha could be a predator which would tend to cast the local ecology
into a state of imbalance. The predatory evidence depends on a showing that South
American climatic conditions would prevail in California. Id. at 433, 86 Cat. Rptr. at
644-45.
7° See, e.g., State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St,2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968), appeal
dismissed, 395 U.S. 163 (1969). People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
71
 See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1893); New York ex rel. Silz v.
Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908).
72 See, e.g., Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1957).
Ta N.Y. Agric. and Mkt. Law 358-a (McKinney 1970).
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world ecological conditions. Like its New York counterpart, the Harris
Law," it was drafted and enacted in concert with the Federal En-
dangered Species Conservation Act of 1969." Although the federal act
represents a national policy, it provides in part for the state to legis-
late on the same subject." Despite the fact that part of the dispute in
Nettleton arose because the New York list of endangered species was
more extensive than the federal schedule," the existence of statutes
at both state and federal levels is a strong expression of the public
interest in ecology. The statutes also represent a response to scientific
determinations that the destruction of part of the world ecological
system constitutes a distinct threat to the remaining portion—of which
each state is a part. 78 Thus, the policy of the Mason Law in discourag-
ing the destruction of endangered animal species is, in effect, an effort
to remove a less than imminent, but still extant, danger to the ecologi-
cal balance of New York State.
Whether such a purpose is properly within the scope of the state's
police power must be considered in light of the judicial context ob-
served in recent aesthetic and environmental decisions. When police
power determinations as to proper purposes are unrelated to personal
constitutional liberties, judicial interference is precluded. 79 Moreover,
courts are extremely reluctant to condemn the remedies contained in
these statutes unless there is neither "rhyme nor reason" between the
remedy and the purposes of the statute.8° The broad-based police power
that these judicial attitudes recognize may easily include the preserva-
tion of the state's environment as it relates to the global environment
as a proper public purpose.
However, the protection of the state's environment, which the
Mason Law affords, is really aimed at activity outside the state, and
74 N.Y. Conserv. Law 187 (McKinney 1970). The Harris Law blends with the
federal act since its list corresponds almost exactly with the federal list, and like the
federal act, it prohibits the importation, transportation, possession or sale of any part of
the body of any endangered species of fish or wildlife.
78 Pub. L. No. 91-135 (Dec. 5, 1969), 83 Stat. 275 (1969).
70 Id.	 7(a)(2), (b)(2).
77 In PaRaid°, Inc. v. Diamond, 39 U.S.L.W. 2330 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a federal court
determined that the discrepancy between the state and federal lists was merely a matter
of scientific disagreement. Neither list, the court concluded, was incorrect, but together
they demonstrated a valid scientific disagreement with reference to certain endangered
species.
78 In Paltaido, the court considered arguments about the amount of research that
bad been done to determine (1) the connection between these endangered species and
the states, and (2) which of these species were close to extinction. In finding that ample
research had been done on both of these points, the court impliectly recognized that
scientific data had established the ecological connection between the endangered species
and New York's environment.
79 See, e.g., Staten Island Loaders v. Waterfront Comm'n, 117 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 439, rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 994 (1954).
80 Defiance Milk Co. v. Dumond, 309 N.Y. 537, 541, 132 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1956).
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state regulation usually extends only to affairs within its borders.
Constitutionally, the federal government, and not the states, is respon-
sible for directly regulating activity in other states" or in other parts
of the world.82 But the Mason Law does not represent a usurpation
of such regulatory power since the statute only indirectly discourages
the out-of-state activity by eliminating the market for the skins of
endangered species in New York. Unfortunately, there is a paucity
of cases dealing with legislation the purpose of which indirectly ex-
tends protection beyond the state's borders. An Ohio case, State v.
Koslof  Fisheries, Inc.," held unconstitutional an exercise of the police
power whereby a state statute forbade the importation and sale of
undersized fish within the state even though such fish had been caught
in out-of-state waters. In reaching this result, the court stated that
"[On this case the protection of wildlife in the waters of the State of
Ohio obviously was not in any way affected by the statute."" This
case can be distinguished from Nettleton on its facts and background.
The most obvious distinction is the lack of scientific information con-
firming the deleterious effect which the taking of undersized fish else-
where would have on Ohio's environment, as contrasted with the
scientifically ascertained connection between the destruction of the
endangered species and New York's environment." A related distinc-
tion is the absence of strong supporting federal legislation in the Ohio
case and its presence in Nettleton.
The scientific data" demonstrating the relationship between the
destruction of endangered species and potential harm to New York's
ecology would seem to establish the purpose of the Mason Law as a
proper one. Nevertheless, the court must still determine whether there
is a sufficient connection between the statutory remedy and the danger
the legislature seeks. to regulate. The dissent" in Nettleton considered
this issue crucial to the outcome since the coverage of the Mason Law
was broader than that of the federal act.
In stressing the issue of the statute's coverage, the dissent relied
largely on an earlier New York decision, People v. Bunis." The broad
role of the judiciary in examining the evil-remedy relationship that
61 U.S. Const. art. I, II 8.
62 U.S. Const. art. I, 110.
88 16 Ohio Op.2d 367, 174 N.E.2d 640 (1960).
84 Id. at 370, 174 N.E.2d at 644.
86 See note 78 supra.
86 Id.
87 There was no actual written dissent in this case. The dissenting judges voted to
affirm the opinion at Special Term. That opinion extensively considered the question of
the statute's coverage. A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 63 Misc.2d 885, 313 N.Y.S.2d
893 (1970).
86 9 N.Y.2d 1, 210 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961).
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the Bunis case posited was itself drawn from the language of Weaver
v. Palmer Bros. Co." The broad view outlined in that case—that the
judiciary will require the state to select the "least restrictive" remedy
—has been questioned and delimited significantly by later decisions."
Other cases in the area of ecology also undermine the broad view of
judicial scrutiny taken in Bunis.
A New York case, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.," lends support
to this narrow view of the scope of judicial review, although it spe-
cifically considered the issue of air pollution abatement. In Boomer,
several homeowners brought suit to enjoin a local cement company
from continuing to pump noxious fumes and dust upon their property.
Even though the court found that the cement company's activity con-
stituted a nuisance, it refused to grant injunctive relief. In declining
to follow a strong precedent for granting relief," the same New York
Court of Appeals characterized the judiciary's capacity to improvise
pollution abatement remedies as being extremely limited.
[lit seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither
equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can pro-
nounce nor prepared to lay down and implement an effective
policy for the elimination of air pollution."
Responsibility for fashioning adequate remedies for these problems,
the court recognized, rests with the legislature which is better able to
uncover and formulate the necessary solutions."
The hesitancy of the Boomer court to utilize judicial power to
remedy ecological problems emphasizes the judicial inclination to re-
frain from substituting its judgment for legislative solutions or inac-
tion. Since the Boomer court refused to grant relief because of the
judiciary's limited ability to determine the proper environmental
remedy, this same court which decided Nettleton would be acting in
an entirely inconsistent manner if it condemned the legislative deter-
minations of the Mason Law as inappropriate. Thus, Nettleton and
Boomer, both decided by the same court, would seem to be entirely
consistent with each other and with the emerging unwillingness to
review legislation designed to protect the environment.
Still another, older, case implicitly recognizes the legislature's
power to enact broad statutory remedies. A Supreme Court decision,
New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg," identified the state legislature
89
 270 U.S. 402 (1925).
90
 See note 79 supra.
91 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
02 Id, at 223-25, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315-17.
98
 Id. at 223, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
94 Id.
08 211 U.S. 31 (1908).
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"itself [as] the judge of the necessity or the expediency of the means
adopted."°° The statute in this case made it illegal to possess certain
proscribed game. Although the statutory language ignored any dis-
tinction between game taken within and without the state, the Supreme
Court approved its broad sweep, holding that it was within the legis-
lature's power to sacrifice accuracy for expediency.° 7
These decisions admit legislative power to determine the appro-
priate remedy for environmental problems and, at the same time,
cast doubt upon the rationale of the dissent in Nettleton. The latter
observation seems valid in light of the aspect of the statute which the
dissent considered too broad. Specifically, the state legislature en-
larged the federal list of endangered species, contending that certain
additional species were near extinction. A later decision, Pallaido, Inc.
v. Diamond, has found the differences between the lists to be based
on honest scientific disagreement." To leave to the legislature the
selection of either of these equally valid scientific approaches comports
with the position of the court as expounded in both Boomer and Si/z.
Although the legislation challenged in Nettleton may indirectly
affect activity beyond the state's borders by discouraging the extinc-
tion of non-indigenous animals, there is abundant support for finding
the Mason Law a proper exercise of the state's police power. Recent
cases indicate that the list of endangered species adopted in New York,
in spite of its controversial character, constitutes a proper standard
by which to formulate a remedy reasonably related to eliminating
the danger to the state.
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Aside from the issues concerning the Mason Law's constitutional
validity, practical questions arise in connection with enforcement of
the Mason Law. Like other statutes oriented toward environmental
protection, the remedy in the Mason Law provides for immediate relief
from the ecological danger. Such relief often results, as in Nettleton,
in the dismantling of a local business organization." Although the
Boomer court felt disinclined to make such a choice judicially, it is
00 Id. at 40.
07 Id.
98 See note 77 supra.
09
 The A.E. Nettleton Co. claimed that the more extensive regulations under the
Mason Law would ruin its business—manufacturing leather goods. Since the federal
standards do not include alligators among the list of endangered species, businesses
located In other jurisdictions would be able to provide a wide range of .shoe and alligator
leather products, whereas A.E. Nettleton's production would be curtailed under the New
York provisions. Retailers, A.E. Nettleton contended, would only buy from a manu-
facturer who offers an entire range of products, including alligator leather goods. As a
result, A.R. Nettleton argued that it would be forced out of business. A.E. Nettleton
Co. v, Diamond, 63 Misc.2d 885, 313 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1970).
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unlikely that the legislature will consider itself so restrained. As a
result, continuation of this legislative pattern appears inevitable.
The harshness of such choices is undeniable. However, the effect
can be more equitably absorbed if future federal legislation adopts
more stringent standards. The particularly damaging impact of the
Mason Law on New York business could be mitigated in other states
having similar legislation if the federal schedule of endangered species
corresponded to the most extensive state list. In this way, situations
may be avoided wherein the businesses of one state are more heavily
handicapped than those of another because the state of their location
adopts stricter regulations. Moreover, more stringent federal regula-
tory standards would tend to discourage state efforts to ignore environ-
mental problems in order to attract the types of businesses which
seek to avert their ecological responsibilities. Inadequate federal stan-
dards should not infringe upon the states' power to prevent the opera-
tion of certain businesses within their boundaries.' Raising these
federal standards would not only advance the cause of environmental
protection, but would also spread more evenly the restrictive impact
of these statutes on the national business community.
CONCLUSION
Recent decisions in the areas of aesthetics and the environment
have altered the traditional balance of police power and Fourteenth
Amendment due process guarantees where personal constitutional
liberties are not in issue. The readjustment of this traditional balance
has resulted in an expansion of. the scope of the state's police power
as well as a diminution in the once transcendent concern for private
property rights.
In large measure, the transformation in the judiciary's concep-
tion of its role in treating police power questions has engendered this
change. The particular reluctance of courts to interfere with legis-
lative determinations as to proper purposes contrasts dramatically with
their earlier inclination to intrude in these matters. The legal context
which these new attitudes have fostered encourages a case-by-case
examination of police power questions, with less emphasis on precedent
and more concern with the facts of each particular case.
100 Numerous cases have recognized the power of the states to curb businesses
operating within their jurisdiction. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933). Such a
power is analogized to the right of the states to abate public nuisances. Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Some decisions have permitted the state to render a
business nearly inoperative for the purpose of preserving the state's natural resources.
Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 210 (1931). Nettleton implicitly raises
an interesting question in this respect; namely, whether a state may effectively dismantle
a business because a part of its activity may be indirectly detrimental to the state. The
Court of Appeals decision in this case represents an affirmative answer.
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No longer need an exercise of the police power be designed to
eliminate a direct threat to public safety, health or morals. Instead,
police power may be exercised to preserve the aesthetic quality of the
state, the state's environment, and, as Nettleton demonstrates, the
state's environment as it relates to the global ecological system. The
increase in the range of the proper purposes of the police power has
been partly enhanced by the de-emphasis of the necessity for a direct
danger to be present before the police power can be invoked. Indeed,
Adams and Nettleton indicate that remote danger is an adequate basis
for the exercise of the police power.
In the legal climate of these recent developments, Nettleton
emerges as a sound decision. Although the Mason Law indirectly dis-
courages activity outside the state, there is sufficient scientific infor-
mation to link that activity with the environment of New York State.
Similarly, the strong national policy concerning endangered animal
species also demonstrates the validity of this connection. Finally, the
honest scientific disagreement over the endangered animal species
strengthens the conclusion that the statutory remedy is neither
arbitrary nor capricious.
The indirect regulation of out-of-state activities for the purpose
of protecting resources within the state, sanctioned by the Nettleton
decision, constitutes a clear expansion of the concept of police power.
Although the extension is consistent with the present judicial charac-
terization of police power, it represents a modern approach to state
regulation, one which confines itself to logical extensions of traditional
state police power concepts to solve new and expansive problems. In
this respect, A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond provides a logical basis
for the development of new state remedies to meet environmental
problems.
ROBERT C. DAVIS
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